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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
Several employees of the New Jersey Department of 
Corrections (NJDOC) filed suit in the District Court for the 
District of New Jersey, alleging employment discrimination 
and harassment on the basis of race and gender at NJDOC 
facilities. The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) 
also instituted a discrimination and harassment lawsuit 
against NJDOC, and this case was consolidated with the 
employees' action to form the present lawsuit. After 
extensive discovery followed by vigorous negotiations, the 
parties, assisted by a court-appointed mediator , drafted a 
proposed Consent Decree aimed at r ectifying the 
complained-of conditions. On May 10, 1996, the District 
Court gave final approval to and implemented the Decree, 
which provided that it would be in effect for four years from 
the date it was implemented, and that the District Court 
was authorized to take "such action as may be necessary or 
appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this Decree." 
 
In May 2000, motivated by certain problems with 
implementation, the District Court extended the Decr ee by 
ten months. The court rested its conclusion that it had the 
power to extend the Consent Decree on two bases. First, it 
opined that language in the Decree granted it this power. 
Second, the court reasoned that it possessed inherent 
power to enforce compliance with the pr ovisions of consent 
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decrees that it approved, and to modify such decrees in 
response to changed circumstances. NJDOC contests the 
ten-month extension of the Decree, arguing that the 
District Court did not have the power to extend the Decree 
under its terms, and that the court failed to make adequate 
findings to support its use of its inherent compliance 
enforcement or modification powers to extend the Decree. 
 
The issue of whether the Decree itself gave the District 
Court the power to extend it requires us to address the 
proper standard of review of a district court's interpretation 
of a consent decree that it has approved and implemented. 
Several of our sister circuits have adopted"deferential de 
novo" as the standard of review for this situation, and the 
plaintiffs encourage us to do likewise. W e have difficulty 
understanding what the oxymoronic standar d of 
"deferential de novo" could mean, and r eject this approach 
in favor of straightforward de novo review. Interpreting the 
Decree de novo, we conclude that the language of the 
Decree does not itself confer power on the District Court to 
extend it. 
 
On the other hand, it is settled that a court does have 
inherent power to enforce a consent decr ee in response to 
a party's non-compliance, and to modify a decr ee in 
response to changed conditions. See, e.g. , Spallone v. 
United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276 (1990) (stating that courts 
have inherent power to enforce compliance with their 
consent decrees); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 
391 U.S. 244, 248 (1968) (noting that courts have inherent 
power to modify a consent decree upon an appr opriate 
showing). Furthermore, a court has br oad equitable power 
to fashion a remedy in its exercise of its compliance 
enforcement and modification powers when a consent 
decree is aimed at remedying discrimination, as is the 
Consent Decree in the case at bar. See Spallone, 493 U.S. 
at 276 (stating that a court can exercise "broad equitable 
powers" when enforcing compliance with a decree aimed at 
remedying past discrimination); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk 
County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 381 n.6 (1992) (r ecognizing that 
a court's modification power "is long-established, broad, 
and flexible") (internal quotes and citation omitted). 
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It is also clear that this broad remedial power can be 
used to extend the effective time period of a consent decree. 
See Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556 (1942) 
(consent decree extended via exercise of modification 
power); United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 
55 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 1995) (parts of consent decree extended 
via exercise of compliance enforcement power). However, a 
court must make specific findings that support its use of 
these inherent powers. See Hughes v. United States, 342 
U.S. 353, 357-58 (1952) (hearing and findings of fact are 
required for exercise of modification power); Harris v. City 
of Philadelphia, 137 F.3d 209, 214 (3d Cir. 1998) (specific 
findings needed for exercise of compliance power). 
 
We conclude that the District Court did not make 
adequate factual findings to support its exer cise of either 
the compliance enforcement or the modification power. The 
court neither identified sufficient incidents of non- 
compliance by NJDOC that would justify an extension of 
the entire Decree, nor did it specify the changed conditions 
that would justify the modification of the ending date of the 
Decree. We therefore will vacate the District Court's Order 
and remand for specific factual findings by the District 
Court, and for the District Court to extend only those parts 
of the Decree whose extension is warranted by those 
specific findings.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The plaintiffs have cross-appealed, contending that the District Court 
abused its discretion by extending the Decr ee only for ten months 
instead of the two years requested by plaintif fs, and that the court 
abused its discretion by denying their r equest for re-argument on their 
motion to hold NJDOC in contempt. We will summarily affirm the 
District Court's Order denying the plaintif fs' motion for re-argument 
because we are satisfied that the court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying it. The plaintiffs' argument that the District should have 
extended the Decree for two years rather than ten months fails for the 
same reason that we will vacate the ten month Decree extension: the 
District Court did not make sufficient factualfindings to support an 
extension of the entire Decree. 
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I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
A. 
 
In June 1991, Richard Smitherman, an African-American 
employee of NJDOC, filed a complaint with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that 
white officers, supervisors, and managers at NJDOC had 
subjected him and other black employees to constant racial 
remarks and slurs. Pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e et seq., the EEOC 
investigated these allegations and found reasonable cause 
to believe that they were true. The EEOC then r eferred the 
complaint to the DOJ. In late 1993, the DOJ infor med the 
State of New Jersey that it had concluded that NJDOC had 
engaged in a pattern of discrimination against black 
employees. After the DOJ was unsuccessful in its attempts 
to get NJDOC to respond voluntarily to the pr oblem, the 
DOJ filed a complaint in the District Court for the District 
of New Jersey in June 1994, alleging a patter n or practice 
of race discrimination and harassment.2  The DOJ filed a 
separate complaint against NJDOC in September 1994 
alleging that NJDOC had engaged in gender discrimination 
as well. 
 
In April 1993, six NJDOC employees (including 
Smitherman) filed their own suit in the district court, 
alleging racial discrimination, harassment, and r etaliation 
against those who complained of discrimination and 
harassment at one NJDOC facility; this complaint was later 
amended to include gender discrimination claims, and 
other NJDOC employees joined the action as plaintif fs.3 In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. There are many defendants to this action, including the State of New 
Jersey. For brevity's sake, we will simply r efer to NJDOC when 
discussing the defendants, since NJDOC is the main defendant. 
 
3. The amended complaint included class allegations, and defined the 
class as all NJDOC employees who complained of racial discrimination 
and harassment against African Americans at NJDOC, and all NJDOC 
employes who complained of sex discrimination and harassment against 
women at NJDOC. The Consent Decree was enter ed into before the 
District Court decided whether to certify the class. Because the Consent 
Decree and various court documents refer to counsel for the individual 
plaintiffs as "class counsel," we will do likewise in this opinion. 
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September 1994, all of the discrimination actions against 
NJDOC were consolidated in the District of New Jersey.4 
The parties then engaged in discovery and began a 16- 
month period of negotiations. These negotiations 
culminated in a settlement agreement, which included over 
$5 million in damages for the class members as well as a 
Consent Decree. The Decree was preliminarily approved by 
the District Court in February 1996, and finally approved 
and entered by the court on May 10, 1996. 
 
B. 
 
The Consent Decree included broad pr ohibitions against 
discrimination and retaliation against African-American 
and female employees and specific penalties for those 
engaging in such conduct. The Decree also pr ovided for a 
comprehensive overhaul of NJDOC's method of handling 
employee complaints of discrimination and retaliation, 
special training for NJDOC employees, reporting 
requirements regarding discrimination complaints and 
discipline, and implementation of a dispute r esolution 
mechanism. The terms of the Decree pr ovided that it would 
be in effect for four years from the date it was implemented 
(May 10, 1996); it also provided that the District Court was 
authorized to take "such action as may be necessary or 
appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this Decree." 
 
While NJDOC and the other defendants admitted no 
liability as part of the settlement, the District Court stated 
in its opinion and order approving the settlement 
agreement that "the plaintiffs' risk of establishing liability in 
this case does not appear to be great." Mor eover, the court 
noted that "[t]hroughout the negotiations, the defendant 
State of New Jersey has recognized the pervasive pattern of 
discrimination that has characterized the NJDOC during 
the relevant class period. . . . [T]he State of New Jersey 
supports the Consent Decree as the best way to eradicate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. With the consent of the parties, this case was referred to then- 
Magistrate Judge Joel A. Pisano, who retained jurisdiction over the 
proceedings after being appointed to the District Court. We will refer to 
all of Judge Pisano's orders and the pr oceedings before him as those of 
the District Court. 
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the Department of Corrections' chronic history of 
discrimination." 
 
In contrast, the parties paint very differ ent pictures of the 
four years that the Decree was in place. Class counsel and 
the DOJ describe numerous violations of the Decree by the 
NJDOC, spanning the entire four years. NJDOC does not 
mention those violations; indeed, it discusses only one area 
in which it admits that it was substantially non-compliant 
with the Decree: the speed with which it completed its 
investigations of employee discrimination complaints, which 
is addressed in P 15 of the Decree. Paragraph 15 provides: 
 
        The EED [Equal Employment Division of NJDOC] shall 
        complete investigations and issue findings on 
        complaints of employment discrimination within forty- 
        five (45) days of receipt of complaints. If, under 
        exceptional circumstances, a finding cannot be issued 
        in this time period, class counsel and the United States 
        shall be notified promptly in writing and given an 
        explanation of the reasons therefor . 
 
After NJDOC was consistently unable to meet the 45-day 
requirement, the parties agreed in August 1997 to extend 
this 45-day period to 60 days. Even after this extension, 
NJDOC was still unable to meet the requir ements of P 15 
until March 2000, two months before the original ending 
date of the Decree. 
 
Several times over the original four year ter m of the 
Decree, the plaintiffs asked the District Court to hold 
NJDOC in contempt for its "extensive and serious violations 
which undermined the Decree's objectives." Class Pl's Br. at 
3. In their last request for contempt sanctions (on 
September 23, 1999), the plaintiffs also r equested that the 
District Court extend the Decree another two years. The 
District Court ruled on this request on May 10, 2000, when 
it declined to hold NJDOC in contempt but extended the 
Decree for ten months. 
 
NJDOC's argument is based on the premise that the 
District Court extended the entire Decr ee based solely on: 
(1) NJDOC's delay in complying with P 15 of the Decree; 
and (2) a naked claim (made by class counsel) of 
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discriminatory discipline.5 In contrast, the plaintiffs argue 
that the District Court extended the Decree not only on 
these bases but also on a long history of NJDOC's non- 
compliance with "virtually every Decree pr ovision." Class 
Pl.'s Br. at 8. More specifically, the plaintiffs contend that, 
in addition to its non-compliance with P 15, NJDOC was 
also in substantial non-compliance with the Decr ee when 
it: (i) delayed for about four months before posting the 
Decree in all NJDOC facilities, in violation ofP 65; (ii) 
delayed for more than three years the training and 
education of NJDOC employees on racial and gender 
discrimination and the implementation of the new internal 
complaint mechanisms, in violation of P 25; (iii) delayed the 
training for investigators in the Equal Employment 
Division, in violation of P 7; (iv) failed to conduct sufficiently 
thorough and proper investigations of internal 
discrimination complaints, in violation of various Decree 
provisions; and (v) failed to provide the DOJ and class 
counsel with information to which they wer e entitled under 
the terms of the Decree, in violation ofPP 32-35. 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs ar gue that the District Court 
found that the evidence of discriminatory discipline that the 
plaintiffs presented was sufficient to make out a prima facie 
case of discriminatory discipline, thus providing a further 
basis for the court to retain jurisdiction over this case. 
 
C. 
 
On May 8, 2000, the District Court held a hearing in 
which it announced that it was going to issue an or der 
extending the decree. At that time it articulated various 
findings intended to support the order . On May 10, 2000, 
the Court entered an order extending the Decree "in its 
entirety, pending further order, through March 1, 2001." 
On June 9, 2000, NJDOC appealed to this Court and 
applied to the District Court for a stay of the Or der. On 
June 22, the plaintiffs moved for furtherfindings in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The discriminatory discipline claim was that NJDOC supervisors 
meted out discipline in a discriminatory fashion, punishing African- 
American employees more severely than white employees for the same or 
similar infractions. 
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support of the Order, and moved for r econsideration of their 
contempt motion and their motion for a two-year extension 
of the Decree, both of which the May 10 Or der had denied. 
The District Court held a hearing on these motions on July 
7, 2000, and denied them in an Order accompanied by a 
Memorandum Opinion dated July 25, 2000. Befor e us are 
NJDOC's appeal of the May 10 Order, as well as the 
plaintiffs' cross-appeals of the May 10 and July 25 Orders.6 
 
Notwithstanding the timely appeals to this Court, the 
District Court's docket entries reflect that the plaintiffs 
have filed with the District Court further r equests for relief 
under the extended Decree, including a r equest to hold 
NJDOC in contempt for its actions during the ten-month 
extended period. The District Court, however , has declined 
to rule on these requests, because it concluded that this 
appeal divested it of jurisdiction over the r equests.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. SS 1331 & 1345, and 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(f)(3). We have 
jurisdiction over NJDOC's appeal and plaintif fs' cross-appeals pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1). 
 
7. Even though the March 1, 2001, ending date of the Decree extension 
has already passed as of the date of the filing of this opinion, this 
appeal 
is not moot for two reasons. First, the plaintiffs' cross-appeal--asking 
us 
to hold that the District Court abused its discr etion by not holding 
NJDOC in contempt and by extending the Decree for only ten months 
rather than the two years plaintiffs asked for--is clearly not moot 
because these claims are not affected by the March 1 extension end 
date, and, because our analysis of whether the District Court abused its 
discretion by not extending the Decree for two years involves the same 
issues as our analysis of NJDOC's appeal, see infra note 18, our 
discussion of these issues in the context of NJDOC's appeal is not moot 
either. Second, NJDOC's appeal is not moot because of the "collateral 
consequences" exception to the mootness doctrine. More specifically, "a 
case is not moot, even if the [appellant's] primary injury is resolved, so 
long as the [appellant] continues to suf fer some harm that a favorable 
court decision would remedy." Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 
S 2.5.2, at 130 (2d ed. 1994). In the case at bar, the District Court has 
delayed, pending the outcome of this appeal, its r esponse to plaintiffs' 
motion to hold NJDOC in contempt for NJDOC's alleged non-compliance 
during the ten-month Decree extension period. This possibility of being 
held in contempt "casts what may well be a substantial adverse effect on 
the interests of the petitioning part[y]." Super Tire Engineering Co. v. 
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In order to determine what findings the District Court 
used as a basis for extending the Decree, we examine all of 
the documents arising from these hearings and Orders (i.e., 
the May 10 and July 25 Orders themselves, the 
Memorandum Opinion that accompanied the July 25 
Order, and the transcripts of the May 8 and July 7 
hearings). In the May 10 Order, the District Court gave a 
short explanation of its reasons and purposes for extending 
the Decree. The court stated that the purposes of the 
extension were to: 
 
        (1) allow class counsel and the United States to 
        continue to monitor the performance of the State in 
        meeting its obligations under the consent decr ee; (2) 
        permit the Court to have the benefit of further 
        submissions and time in order to determine how long 
        the consent decree ought to remain open; (3) and 
        permit the State to demonstrate its intention, 
        willingness, and ability to perform its obligations under 
        the consent decree. 
 
The reasons the District Court gave for extending the 
Decree were that "until approximately the first quarter of 
2000 the State was not in substantial compliance with the 
consent decree, principally in connection with its obligation 
to issue timely decisions regarding discrimination 
complaints [i.e., P 15]; . . . and it further appearing that 
class counsel have raised a claim of discriminatory 
discipline." 
 
NJDOC argues that it is clear from the wording of the 
May 10 Order that the District Court extended the Decree 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 122 (1974). The District Court has also delayed, 
pending the outcome of this appeal, its decision whether to extend the 
Decree beyond the ten-month extension. Because we will remand this 
case to the District Court for more specific factual findings that may 
include, for example, findings of NJDOC's non-compliance with the 
Decree between May 10, 2000 and March 1, 2001, the District Court 
may decide that a further extension of the Decr ee is warranted, which 
would have an "adverse effect on the inter ests" of NJDOC. Id. Thus, this 
appeal is also not moot under the rule set forth in Super Tire. See also 
Union Nat'l Bank of Pittsburgh v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 569 F.2d 
742, 746-47 (3d Cir. 1977). 
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solely on the basis of its past non-compliance withP 15, 
along with a conclusory claim of discriminatory discipline. 
Much of NJDOC's argument rests on its contention that 
these two points are not a sufficient basis for extending the 
entire Decree another 10 months. 
 
The District Court presented more explanation of its 
reasons for extending the Decree at the May 8 and July 7 
hearings. The plaintiffs argue that the record from these 
hearings shows that the District Court based the extension 
on NJDOC's sum total non-compliance with the Decr ee over 
the four years it had been in place. While this non- 
compliance was "principally" in connection with NJDOC's 
failure to meet its P 15 obligations, the plaintiffs contend 
that it also includes the other incidents of non-compliance 
outlined at the end of Section I.B. supra, namely that 
NJDOC delayed employee training and education, delayed 
posting the Consent Decree, perfor med inadequate 
investigations of discrimination complaints, and failed to 
provide the DOJ and class counsel with r equested 
information. 
 
The plaintiffs support their position by noting that at the 
May 8 hearing the District Court referr ed to "a number of 
other specific complaints" by class counsel and individual 
class members, in addition to NJDOC's P 15 non- 
compliance. The plaintiffs also point to portions of the July 
7 hearing where the court, in response to NJDOC's claim 
that it was improper to extend the Decr ee based solely on 
non-compliance with P 15, detailed other pr oblems that had 
arisen with NJDOC's performance under the Decree aside 
from P 15 issues. These incidents, which the court stated 
are "matters of public record in connection with this case," 
were described by the District Court at the July 7 hearing 
as "an issue and a complaint about the qualifications of 
investigators and the training that had been given to 
investigators," an "issue" regar ding "the training and 
education of all employees, . . . an issue raised as to the 
racially offensive cartoon at Northern State Prison, . . . a 
dispute raised as to the communications that Class 
Counsel said they were entitled to," and"another issue . . . 
which had to do with whether some complaints of criminal 
conduct" were improperly referr ed within NJDOC. After 
laying out these "issues," the court stated the following: 
 
                                14 
  
        I go through all of this for the purpose of 
        demonstrating that I believe that I had justifiable 
        motivations in extending the entire Decr ee, and not 
        simply one portion of it. That, in fact, ther e had been 
        enough of a record made on issues other than the 
        timing of the EED decisions, which justify the Court in 
        seeing to it that all parts of the Consent Decr ee remain 
        in force for a period of time. . . . I found there to be 
        enough problems with other parts of the Decr ee than 
        paragraph 15, to justify extending it in its entir ety. 
 
After the court made this explanation, counsel for NJDOC 
asked the court whether the above was a new holding as of 
July 7 or a clarification of a previous holding. The court 
replied it was both. 
 
In the Memorandum Opinion that accompanied its July 
25 Order, the court denied the plaintif fs' motion for further 
specific factual findings supporting the Decr ee extension, 
explaining this denial by stating that "to the extent that the 
Court found it necessary to reach the factual issues 
specified by plaintiff in this motion, the Court has done so 
and such findings can be found in the transcripts of several 
hearings held over the past year." 
 
As noted above, the District Court also based the Decree 
extension on the plaintiffs' allegation of discriminatory 
discipline by NJDOC (i.e., that NJDOC meted out discipline 
to its employees in a discriminatory fashion). The court, 
however, did not make a finding or conclude that NJDOC 
engaged in discriminatory discipline, but instead stated the 
following regarding the discriminatory discipline claim at 
the May 8 hearing: 
 
        I further find that class counsel have raised a claim of 
        discriminatory discipline of corrections officers 
        following the analysis of rubric of the Hazelwood case 
        and others which justifies and in fact, it doesn't justify, 
        it requires the court to continue to exer cise jurisdiction 
        over the case in order to adjudicate any legitimate 
        claim of discriminatory discipline. The fact of the 
        matter is that the court has not yet adjudicated this 
        issue. . . . I feel that the court must not only exercise 
        jurisdiction over the continuation of the dispute but 
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        also entertain further proceedings. . . . I don't know 
        how this discriminatory discipline claim is going to play 
        out, but I do need under the--on the strength of the 
        record that I have, I do need to exer cise, continue to 
        exercise jurisdiction over the dispute. 
 
NJDOC contends that the District Court never made any 
real findings on this issue, and that the plaintiffs have 
merely raised an allegation, which is not an adequate basis 
for extending the Decree. The DOJ counters that the above- 
quoted section is a finding that the evidence of 
discriminatory discipline was sufficient to make out a prima 
facie case and thus to shift the burden to the defendants to 
produce countering evidence under the rule in Hazelwood 
School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 
(1977). 
 
II. Discussion 
 
The District Court rested its conclusion that it had the 
power to extend the Consent Decree on two bases: (1) 
language in the Decree itself; and (2) its inherent power, 
either to enforce compliance with the pr ovisions of its 
consent decree or to modify a consent decr ee in response to 
changed circumstances. NJDOC argues that the Decree 
language did not give the District Court the power to extend 
the Decree. NJDOC also contends that a court's inherent 
power to enforce compliance with a consent decr ee only 
extends to the particular provisions that the court found 
were violated, so that the District Court could only extend 
P 15 of the Decree, as that was the only provision for which 
the court specifically found NJDOC to be non-compliant. 
Finally, NJDOC asserts that the District Court made no 
findings of changed circumstances that wer e sufficient to 
support a modification of the Decree. Although the plaintiffs 
contend that NJDOC's non-compliance was such a changed 
circumstance, NJDOC rejoins that a court's compliance 
enforcing power, not its modification power, is the proper 
means for addressing a party's non-compliance. NJDOC 
further argues that, even if a party's non-compliance is a 
changed circumstance warranting modification, the only 
non-compliance by NJDOC that the District found was non- 
compliance with P 15, which was not a sufficiently 
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significant change in circumstances to warrant 
modification. 
 
A. Did the Language of the Decree Give the District 
Court the Power to Extend the Decree? 
 
A consent decree is a hybrid of a contract and a court 
order. A decree embodies the agr eement of the parties and 
as such is in some respects contractual in nature; however, 
a decree is also in the form of a judicial order that the 
parties expect will be subject to the rules generally 
applicable to other judgments and orders. See Rufo v. 
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992). 
 
1. Standard of Review 
 
We first address a threshold question concerning the 
proper standard for our review of the District Court's 
construction and interpretation of the Consent Decree. 
Because of the hybrid contractual/court order status of a 
consent decree, there is some confusion in the courts (and 
disagreement among the parties) as to what standard of 
review we should apply here. NJDOC states that our review 
is simply plenary, and cites to a Seventh Cir cuit case for 
support: United States v. Board of Education of Chicago, 
717 F.2d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he interpretation of 
consent decree provisions, like the interpretation of 
contract provisions, is a matter of law and subject to 
plenary review on appeal."). As the DOJ points out, 
however, immediately after stating that the standard of 
review is plenary, Board of Education of Chicago then states 
that "[t]he district court's views on interpr etation, however, 
are entitled to deference." Id. 
 
Numerous other cases also take this seemingly 
contradictory "plenary, but deferential" approach to the 
review of a district court's interpretation or construction of 
a consent decree. See, e.g., Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of 
Chippawa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 371-72 (6th Cir. 
1998) (holding that "deferential de novo" is the proper 
standard of review for a district court's interpretation its a 
consent decree); Goluba v. School Dist. of Ripon, 45 F.3d 
1035, 1037-38 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying deferential 
de novo review to district court's interpr etation of a consent 
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decree, and noting further that abuse of discr etion review is 
appropriate where "the judge oversaw the consent decree 
for an extended period of time and the decree is particularly 
complex or intricate"); Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. 
Comm'n, 934 F.2d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir . 1991) (applying 
deferential de novo review); Ber ger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 
1556, 1576 n.32 (2d Cir. 1985) (applying deferential de 
novo because "few persons are in a better position to 
understand the meaning of a consent decree than the 
district judge who oversaw and approved it"). 
 
This Court, in contrast, has held many times that a 
district court's construction and interpretation of a consent 
decree is subject to straightforward plenary or de novo 
review. See United States v. New Jersey, 194 F.3d 426, 430 
(3d Cir. 1999) ("Whether extrinsic evidence is required to 
interpret a consent decree is itself a question of law subject 
to plenary review."); Harris v. Philadelphia, 137 F.3d 209, 
212 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Since consent decr ees have the 
attributes of contracts voluntarily undertaken, we exercise 
plenary review over a district court's construction of a 
consent decree."); Washington Hosp. v. White, 889 F.2d 
1294, 1299 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that the construction of 
a court-ordered stipulation, which was"functionally 
equivalent to a consent order or consent decr ee, . . . is a 
matter of law over which we exercise plenary r eview"); 
Thermice Corp. v. Viston Corp., 832 F .2d 248, 252 (3d Cir. 
1987) (stating that the question of whether extrinsic 
evidence is necessary for the interpretation of a consent 
decree is a question of law subject to plenary review); Fox 
v. United States Dept. of Housing, 680 F .2d 315, 319-20 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (same).8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Against this phalanx of authority, ther e is one Third Circuit case 
that 
can possibly be read as implicitly adopting the deferential de novo 
standard for review of a district court's interpretation of a consent 
decree. In Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 901 F.2d 311 
(3d Cir. 1990), the panel at one point notes that it has plenary review 
over the construction of a settlement agreement that is in the manner of 
a consent decree, but then states later that, because the district court 
had "extensive experience" with the case and the final settlement 
agreement between the parties, the district court's conclusions about the 
meaning of the agreement's jurisdictional pr ovisions should be given 
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We also think that the Third Cir cuit position is the more 
reasonable one, because the concept of "deferential de 
novo" (or "deferential plenary") r eview seems to be an 
oxymoron. Black's Law Dictionary defines"de novo" as 
"[a]new, afresh, a second time," and defines "plenary" as 
"[f]ull, entire, complete, absolute, per fect, unqualified." 
Black's Law Dictionary 392, 1038 (5th ed. 1979). These are, 
of course, familiar notions to appellate judges, the sinews of 
our everyday work. It strains imagination to conceive how 
our review could be both "anew, complete, absolute and 
unqualified," while at the very same time defer ential to the 
District Court's interpretation. Review that gives deference 
to the decision that is under review is simply not absolute 
and unqualified review. The courts that apply"deferential 
de novo" do not explain how they amalgamate these two 
seemingly incompatible standards.9  We decline to follow 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
"some deference." Id. at 319 n.11, 320. Halderman cites no Third Circuit 
case as support for its decision to give defer ence to the district 
court's 
construction of the consent decree, but instead cites the Ninth Circuit 
case of Keith v. Volpe, 784 F .2d 1457 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 
We read Halderman's statement about deference as a function of the 
unique character and long history of the Pennhurst litigation and a nod 
to the stewardship, and memorable imprint on that litigation, of the 
extraordinary District Judge who handled it, the late Raymond J. 
Broderick. See, e.g., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977); 533 F. Supp. 
661 (E.D. Pa. 1982); 567 F. Supp. 1504 (E.D. Pa. 1983); 610 F. Supp. 
1221 (E.D. Pa. 1985), 784 F. Supp 215 (E.D. Pa. 1992). We do not think 
that the panel intended to contravene established Third Circuit case law. 
See supra at 21-22. However, to the extent that Halderman is read to be 
inconsistent with earlier case law, the earlier case law providing for 
straightforward plenary review contr ols. See O. Hommel Co. v. Ferro 
Corp., 659 F.2d 340, 354 (3d Cir. 1981) (stating that, according to Third 
Circuit Internal Operating Procedur es, one panel cannot overrule a prior 
panel precedent, and giving effect to the earlier of two inconsistent 
Third 
Circuit opinions). 
 
9. The panel in Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippawa Indians v. Engler, 146 
F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 1998), recognized the self-contradictory nature of 
"deferential de novo" and interpr eted it to mean that the district 
court's 
interpretation should be used as an additional tool for contract 
interpretation. See id. at 371. Of course, this kind of review would be 
neither deferential nor de novo: since the district court's interpretation 
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these other courts and instead adhere to the long tradition 
in this Circuit of reviewing a district court's interpretation 
of a consent decree de novo. 
 
2. Whether the Language of the Consent Decr ee Gave 
        the District Court the Power to Extend the Decr ee 
 
As noted above, the District Court at the July 7 hearing 
explained how it interpreted the language of the Consent 
Decree as giving the court the power to extend the Decree. 
The sections that the court used in its analysis pr ovide: 
 
        General Injunctive Relief 
 
         3. The State defendants and their employees, 
        consistent with their obligations under curr ent law, 
        shall not engage in any act or practice that has the 
        purpose or effect of unlawfully discriminating against 
        any employee in the NJDOC in any term or condition 
        of employment because of such employee's race (black) 
        or sex (female), including, but not limited to, cr eating, 
        maintaining, supporting or condoning a racially or 
        sexually hostile work environment. 
 
         * * * * 
 
         59. . . . . Any dispute within the scope of this Decree 
        which, in the reasonable opinion of counsel, cannot be 
        effectively resolved through the pr ocedures set forth in 
        this Decree, may be brought to the attention of Judge 
        Pisano, provided that prior thereto counsel have 
        conferred and have engaged in good faith ef forts to 
        resolve it. 
 
         * * * * 
 
        Jurisdiction of the Court 
 
         63. This Court shall retain jurisdiction of the matters 
        covered by this Decree for a period of four (4) years 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
would merely be one more interpretive tool among many, the 
interpretation would not be accorded deference, but the review would not 
be de novo either, because it would accommodate the interpretation of 
the lower court in some fashion. Thus, Sault Ste. Marie's "deferential de 
novo" review is simply a misleading name for some level of review 
between deferential and de novo--in r eality, a hodgepodge standard. 
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        from the date of entry of this Decree for such action as 
        may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate the 
        purposes of this Decree. The provisions of this Decree 
        shall be in effect for a period of four (4) years from the 
        date of entry of this Decree, at which time all 
        obligations under this Decree shall end. 
 
         64. Any party may seek to modify the pr ocedures 
        enumerated in this Decree, provided that the proposed 
        modifications effectuate the purposes of this Decree.10 
 
The court began its analysis by noting that P 3 of the 
Decree, entitled "General Injunctive Relief," broadly 
prohibits NJDOC from engaging in any unlawful racial or 
gender employment discrimination; the court interpr eted 
this section as meaning that one of the purposes of the 
Decree was to empower the court to provide broad 
injunctive relief in response to any discriminatory activity 
by NJDOC, thus giving the court the power to extend the 
Decree if necessary to prevent discrimination by NJDOC. 
The District Court observed that P 63 of the Decree gives 
the court jurisdiction over matters covered by the Decree 
for four years, and that P 59 provides that disputes that 
cannot be resolved by the parties on their own can be 
brought to the District Court for resolution. The court then 
concluded that 
 
        I find in order to effectuate the purposes of this Decree, 
        that I needed to extend it for a period of time, and the 
        order extending the Decree was made within the four 
        years of its initial term of existence. So, Ifind that 
        there is language in the Decree itself, if a Court were to 
        consider this as a matter of contract interpr etation or 
        enforcement of a settlement agreement, to more than 
        justify the Court's extension. 
 
In sum, the District Court concluded that the first sentence 
of P 63 and the whole of P 64 gave it the power to extend 
the Decree in order to effectuate the substance of P 3 or 
resolve a dispute under the guidelines of P 59, as long as 
the court ordered such an extension within the four year 
period of jurisdiction provided by P 63. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. All the parties understand the term"Any party" here to include the 
District Court. 
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NJDOC responds that the language of the Decr ee, 
specifically the second sentence of P 63 ("the previous shall 
be in effect for a period of four years . . . at which time all 
obligations under this Decree shall end"), clearly and 
unambiguously establishes that both the District Court's 
jurisdiction and NJDOC's obligations under the Decree end 
four years after the Decree is entered, i.e., May 10, 2000. It 
submits that, because there is no provision in the rest of 
the Decree that specifically allows the District Court to 
extend its jurisdiction, the court lacked such power under 
the express terms of the Decree. NJDOC argues further 
that P 64 reserved to the court only a limited right "to 
modify the procedures enumerated in the Decree", and that 
no power to modify non-procedural aspects was given to the 
court; in its view, the length of time of the Decr ee is clearly 
a non-procedural element of the Decree. Therefore, NJDOC 
contends, its obligations under the Decree ter minated on 
May 10, 2000, and the Decree did not expr essly grant the 
District Court any power to modify this provision.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. NJDOC also argues that, if we conclude that P 63 is ambiguous 
regarding whether the District Court has the power to modify the Decree 
by extending it, extrinsic evidence from the negotiations over the 
language of the Decree supports NJDOC's r eading. During these 
negotiations, the DOJ originally proposed afive year period for the 
Decree, with the following proviso: "This period may be extended by the 
order of this Court for good cause shown." NJDOC countered with the 
following: "The provisions of this decr ee shall be in effect for a period 
of 
two years from the date of the entry of this decree, at which time all 
obligations under this decree shall end." NJDOC contends, quite 
forcefully, that, because the Decree asfinally agreed upon did not 
contain the extension for good cause language, we should conclude that 
the parties intended to omit the court's power to extend for good cause 
from the Decree. 
 
Class counsel counters that the "good cause" language may have been 
omitted because it was redundant, not because the parties decided to 
omit this power from the Decree. W e find this argument lacking in merit. 
No other part of the Decree clearly gives the District Court power to 
extend the Decree for good cause, and it seems quite unlikely that 
parties would strike out clear language because it was redundant of 
other, unclear language. Class counsel contends that the parties may 
have considered the language redundant of the District Court's inherent 
equitable power to modify a decree. If that was the case, however, the 
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Class counsel and the DOJ reply with thr ee arguments. 
First, they assert that we should apply "defer ential de novo" 
review to the District Court's interpretation of the Consent 
Decree; we have already explained above why we reject this 
contention. Second, the plaintiffs contend that the first 
sentence of P 63, which provides that the District Court has 
jurisdiction to take "such action as may be necessary or 
appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this Decree," was 
broad enough to empower the court to extend the Decree in 
response to violations and delays in implementing the 
provisions of the Decree that threatened to undermine 
attainment of the Decree's purposes. The District Court's 
summary of the Decree's purposes is set forth in the margin.12 
 
Third, plaintiffs rely on P 64, which provides that the 
District Court may "modify the procedur es enumerated in 
this Decree, provided that the proposed modifications 
effectuate the purposes of this Decree." Plaintiffs submit 
that the extension of the Decree is not a modification of the 
parties' substantive duties under the Decree, but is simply 
a modification of the amount of time that they ar e subject 
to these duties. The plaintiffs add that four previous 
modifications of time limits under the Decr ee have been 
effected under the procedural modification provision in 
P 64, and thus urge that this pr ovision gives the District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
court extended the Decree based on this equitable power rather than 
upon an express Decree provision; we address this basis for the Decree 
extension in Section II.B. infra. At all events, while NJDOC has the 
better 
part of this argument, and its extrinsic evidence provides some support 
for its interpretation of the Decree, we need not resort to this extrinsic 
evidence, because we conclude that the Decree's express terms do not 
give the District Court the power to extend the Decr ee. 
 
12. The District Court summarized the purposes of the Consent Decree 
in its May 10, 1996, Order and opinion appr oving the Decree: 
 
        [T]o completely overhaul the NJDOC's current practices in handling 
        complaints of racial and sexual discrimination and any resultant 
        retaliation; to ensure that supervisors and employees who 
        discriminate, harass, or retaliate against complainants receive 
        appropriate discipline; and to alleviate the hostile work 
environment 
        that is alleged to pervade the NJDOC by providing extensive 
training 
        for all supervisors and employees. 
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Court the power to extend the time limit of the Decr ee 
itself. 
 
We are not persuaded by the plaintif fs' arguments. The 
clear language of P 63 states that the Decr ee ends after four 
years. The plaintiffs' arguments, considered together, at 
most show that the first sentence of P 63 and P 64 may 
imply that the District Court has the power to extend the 
Decree under the Decree's terms. However, the clear 
language of the second sentence of P 63, explicitly limiting 
the Decree time period to four years while not providing any 
express means for the District Court to extend this time 
period, see supra note 11, trumps this possible implication 
of the first sentence of P 63 and P 64. 
 
A court should interpret a consent decr ee as written and 
should not impose terms when the parties did not agree to 
those terms. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & 
Hosp., 901 F.2d 311, 319 (3d Cir. 1990). Interpreting the 
Decree as expressly giving the District Court the power to 
extend the Decree beyond its four year ter m flies in the face 
of the clear language of P 63. Further more, we are 
convinced that the extension of the Decree beyond its four 
year term, rather than being a mere pr ocedural 
modification covered by P 64, ef fects a modification of 
NJDOC's substantive duties under the Decree, for the 
amount of time that NJDOC is subject to the Decr ee 
provisions is a substantive element of the Decr ee. We thus 
defer to the clear language of P 63 and hold that the 
language of the Decree cannot be used to justify the 
District Court's extension. 
 
B. Did the District Court Properly Extend the Decree via 
an Exercise of its Own Inherent Equitable Powers? 
 
1. 
 
The District Court also based the Decree extension on: (1) 
its inherent power to enforce compliance with its consent 
decrees; and (2) its inherent power to modify consent 
decrees. We review a district court's orders to enforce 
compliance with or to modify a consent decree for abuse of 
discretion. See EEOC v. Local 580, 925 F.2d 588, 594-95 
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(2d Cir. 1991); Delaware V alley Citizens' Council for Clean 
Air v. Pennsylvania, 674 F.2d 976, 978 (3d Cir. 1982). 
However, the District Court's conclusions about the scope 
of its inherent powers is a question of law that is reviewed 
de novo. See Daniel S. v. Scranton Sch. Dist. , 230 F.3d 90, 
97 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that questions of law are reviewed 
de novo). 
 
As we noted at the outset, there is no doubt that the 
District Court possesses these two powers. See Spallone v. 
United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276 (1990) ("[C]ourts have 
inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful 
orders . . . .") (internal quotations and citation omitted); 
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 
248-49 (1968) (holding that a court can modify a consent 
decree "upon an appropriate showing" of "the specific facts 
and circumstances" in the particular case);  Delaware Valley 
Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 674 F.2d at 980 (stating that 
a provision in a consent decree that gave the court the 
power to modify the decree "is merely declaratory of a 
district court's inherent power to modify a consent decree, 
even over the objection of one of the parties"). Because the 
District Court seems to have concluded that it had the 
power to extend the Decree as an exercise of either its 
compliance enforcement or modification power , we begin 
our analysis by considering the extent of these two powers.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. We note that previous cases have not expressly bifurcated the 
doctrine between the modification and compliance enforcement powers 
in the manner that we do here. Rather, the cases have addressed either 
just the modification power or just the compliance enforcement power, 
and thus had no occasion for an overview. We are satisfied, however, 
that an examination of the relevant case law supports our approach, as 
there are distinct bodies of jurisprudence and different standards 
associated with the compliance enforcement and modification powers. 
Compare Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990), and Shillitani v. 
United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966) (addr essing courts' compliance 
enforcement power) with Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 
367 (1992), and United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 
(1968) (addressing courts' modification power). Furthermore, we believe 
that clearly differentiating between the modification and compliance 
enforcement powers would serve to clarify the law and facilitate district 
courts' proper exercise of these powers. 
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It is well-settled that a court has broad equitable power 
to fashion a remedy while modifying a consent decree, and 
has similarly broad equitable power when enfor cing 
compliance with a decree if the decree is aimed at 
remedying discrimination, as is the Consent Decree in the 
case at bar. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suf folk County Jail, 502 
U.S. 367, 381 & n.6 (1992) (recognizing that a court's 
modification power "is long-established, br oad, and 
flexible," and that a court should apply "aflexible 
modification standard in institutional r eform litigation") 
(internal quotes and citation omitted); Spallone, 493 U.S. at 
276 ("When a district court's [compliance enforcement] 
order is necessary to remedy past discrimination, the court 
has an additional basis for the exercise of br oad equitable 
powers."). 
 
Furthermore, the broad remedial power contained within 
the modification and compliance enforcement powers can 
be used to extend a consent decree.14  See Chrysler Corp. v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. In certain places in its brief, NJDOC seems to argue that a court can 
exercise the compliance enforcement power only via its contempt power, 
and that because the District Court never held NJDOC in contempt, its 
use of the compliance power was illegitimate. This argument is 
unavailing for several reasons. First, in support of its claim NJDOC 
quotes the following sentence from Spallone , 493 U.S. at 276: "[C]ourts 
have inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders 
through civil contempt." Of course, this sentence does not state that 
courts can enforce compliance only thr ough civil contempt, but that they 
can enforce compliance via contempt. Furthermore, NJDOC omits the 
sentence that immediately follows the above quote fr om Spallone: "When 
a district court's order is necessary to r emedy past discrimination, the 
court has an additional basis for the exercise of broad equitable powers," 
id., which implies that a court has expansive powers that go beyond its 
contempt power when it is remedying past discrimination, as is the 
situation in the case before us. Second, ther e is case law that directly 
and clearly contradicts NJDOC's claim that a court can exercise its 
compliance enforcement power only via its contempt power. In Berger v. 
Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556 (2d Cir. 1985), the Second Circuit stated that 
"[e]nsuring compliance with a prior or der is an equitable goal which a 
court is empowered to pursue even absent afinding of contempt." Id. at 
1569 (citing Alexander v. Hill, 707 F .2d 780, 783 (4th Cir. 1983)) 
(emphasis added); see also Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 
901 F.2d 311, 316 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming the district court's 
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United States, 316 U.S. 556 (1942) (affir ming the extension 
of a consent decree via the district court's exercise of its 
modification power);15 United States v. Local 359, United 
Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding 
that "it was well within the district court's inherent power" 
to extend parts of a consent judgment decree as an exercise 
of the court's compliance enforcement power). However, 
because a court's compliance enforcement power is "not 
unlimited," Spallone, 493 U.S. at 276, a court may use its 
compliance enforcement power to extend one or more 
provisions of a decree only if such compliance enforcement 
is essential to remedy the violation and thus provide the 
parties with the relief originally bargained for in the consent 
order. As the Second Circuit noted in Local 359, "[u]ntil 
parties to such an instrument have fulfilled their express 
obligations, the court has continuing authority and 
discretion--pursuant to its independent, juridical interests 
--to ensure compliance." 55 F.3d at 69 (quoting EEOC v. 
Local 580, 925 F.2d 588, 593 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
 
A court must abide by similar standards when using its 
modification power to extend a decree. In their arguments 
on the modification standard, the plaintif fs cite cases from 
the Sixth Circuit which seem to adopt a br oader standard 
than we think is supported by the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on this issue. In Heath v. De Cour cy, 888 
F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1989), the court stated that "[t]o modify 
[institutional reform] consent decr ees, the court need only 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
extension of the term of certain parts of a court-approved settlement 
agreement because of non-compliance by defendant; the district court 
considered holding defendant in contempt but opted not to). Finally, the 
District Court was quite clear that it could have held NJDOC in 
contempt for its non-compliance, but it chose not to out of respect for 
NJDOC's difficult mission. 
 
15. Although Chrysler involved a consent decree that explicitly gave the 
district court jurisdiction to modify the decr ee, the Supreme Court has 
held that provisions in a consent decree that give a court the power to 
modify the decree are merely declaratory of a district court's inherent 
modification power. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 
(1932); see also Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. 
Pennsylvania, 674 F.2d 976, 980 (3d Cir . 1982). 
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identify a defect or deficiency in its original decree which 
impedes achieving its goal. . . . A modification will be 
upheld if it furthers the original purpose of the decree in a 
more efficient way . . . ." Id. at 1110; see also Vanguards of 
Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 23 F.3d 1013, 1018 (6th Cir. 
1994) (quoting above language from Heath ). We do not 
think, however, that a district court has the power to 
modify a decree upon identifying merely a"defect or 
deficiency" in the decree or a "mor e efficient way" of 
furthering the decree's purpose. We conclude instead that a 
district court may modify a consent decree (in response to 
a request from a plaintiff) only upon making a finding that 
conditions have changed so that the "basic purpose of the 
original consent decree" has been "thwart[ed]," Chrysler, 
316 U.S. at 562, meaning that "time and experience have 
demonstrated" that "the decree has failed to accomplish 
th[e] result" that it was "specifically designed to achieve," 
United Shoe, 391 U.S. at 249.16 Merely identifying a more 
efficient way of carrying out a decree does not justify a 
district court modifying that decree. 
 
Courts have extended a decree or parts of a decree when 
a change in circumstances thwarted the basic purpose and 
intent of the decree, see Chrysler, 316 U.S. at 562-64, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. NJDOC argues that the more r estrictive standard from Rufo v. 
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992), should be used to 
determine whether this Decree can be modified. In Rufo, the Supreme 
Court held that a "party seeking modification of a consent decree may 
meet its initial burden by showing a significant change either in factual 
conditions or in law," and a change in factual conditions usually must 
"make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous" and must 
be unanticipated by the party seeking modification. See id. at 384-85. 
Rufo, however, set the standard for cases in which the defendant seeks 
to have a decree modified, while in the case at bar it is the plaintiffs 
seeking modification. The Supreme Court has set a more rigorous 
standard for defendants seeking modification because defendants 
usually seek modification "not to achieve the purposes of the provisions 
of the decree, but to escape their impact." United States v. United Shoe 
Mach. Corp. 391 U.S. 244, 249 (1968); see also United States v. Local 
560, 974 F.2d 315, 331-32 & n.9 (3d Cir . 1992) (noting that the United 
Shoe standard applies when a plaintif f is seeking modification of a 
decree, while Rufo's more restrictive standard applies when a defendant 
is seeking modification). 
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when there had been "pervasive violations" of the decree by 
one party, see Local 359, 55 F.3d at 69, and when one 
party was in substantial non-compliance with the decree, 
see Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. , 901 F.2d 
311, 316 (3d Cir. 1990); Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, 
807 F.2d 330 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 
2. 
 
Even if a court has the power to modify or enfor ce 
compliance with a consent decree, it must support its 
issuance of such an order with specific findings of fact. See 
Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1952) 
(holding that an adequate hearing and findings of fact are 
required for exercise of modification power); Harris v. City 
of Philadelphia, 137 F.3d 209, 213-14 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(holding that the district court's expansion of a consent 
decree could not be interpreted as a pr oper exercise of the 
court's compliance enforcement power because nofinding 
had been made of the party's lack of compliance); 
Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, 807 F.2d 330, 332, 335, 
338-39 (3d Cir. 1986) (upholding district court's two-year 
extension of a consent decree because district court's clear 
and detailed factual findings showed that the party's non- 
compliance frustrated the purposes of the decr ee). 
 
The determination of whether the District Court 
appropriately exercised its modification or compliance 
enforcement power in extending the Decr ee in this case 
turns on whether the District Court corr ectly conceived the 
limits of its authority and made adequate legal conclusions 
and factual findings to support its exercise of one of these 
powers. More specifically, the key issue is whether the 
District Court clearly specified a proper legal basis for its 
extension of the Decree, and then either made adequate 
findings of non-compliance by NJDOC to justify extending 
the entire Decree for ten months, or made adequate 
findings of changed circumstances to justify modifying the 
Decree by extending it. 
 
The District Court vacillated over whether it was using 
the compliance enforcement or the modification power to 
extend the Decree; the court seems to have (implicitly) 
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concluded that it was justified in using either power, or 
perhaps some combination of the two. See  Tr. of July 7, 
2000 hearing at 29-32. We conclude that the District 
Court's findings of fact were insufficient to justify its use of 
either the modification or the compliance enfor cement 
powers. The only finding that the District Court made with 
any specificity was the finding in the May 10 Or der that 
NJDOC was not in substantial compliance with P 15 of the 
Consent Decree: "[U]ntil approximately the first quarter of 
2000 the State [of New Jersey] was not in substantial 
compliance with the consent decree, principally in 
connection with its obligation to issue timely decisions 
regarding discrimination complaints." Beyond this finding, 
the District Court merely noted certain "issues," 
"problems," and "disputes" that had arisen between the 
parties during the course of the four year Decr ee, and 
reasoned that there was "enough of a r ecord made on 
issues other than the timing of the EED decisions" to justify 
the extension of the entire Decree. 
 
The District Court did not make any specific findings of 
fact regarding these "issues" in the May 10 and July 25 
Orders or at the May 8 and July 7 hearings. The court 
declined to make such findings even after the plaintiffs, 
realizing that the court's factual findings were likely 
insufficient to support the extension of the entir e Decree, 
moved the court for specific findings of non-compliance by 
NJDOC following the issuance of the May 10 Or der. 
Instead, in an exercise of inchoate incorporation by 
reference in its July 25 Memorandum, the District Court 
pointed to "the transcripts of several hearings held over the 
past year" as sufficient factual findings to support its 
extension of the Decree. The District Court also noted that 
the plaintiffs had "raised a claim of discriminatory 
discipline" by NJDOC, and concluded that this too required 
it to extend the Decree. Significantly, however, the court did 
not find that NJDOC had engaged in discriminatory 
discipline, but only observed that the plaintif fs had claimed 
that NJDOC had done so. 
 
These "findings"--oblique references to unspecified 
sections of hearing transcripts compiled over the course of 
a year, and taking notice of an allegation made by the 
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plaintiffs--are not sufficient to support the District Court's 
extension of the entire Decree as an exer cise of either its 
compliance enforcement or its modification power. First, an 
unadjudicated allegation by one party is not a pr oper basis 
for extending a consent decree. Second, the court's 
references to problems with the Decr ee (other than with 
P 15) that arose in hearings "held over the past year" are 
random and unspecific, and would requir e us to rummage 
through the record to determine exactly what these findings 
are. But a Court of Appeals should not be r equired to scour 
the District Court's records and transcripts, without 
specific guidance, in order to construct specific findings of 
fact that support the District Court's Order; rather, the 
District Court should make specific findings in the first 
place to facilitate proper appellate review. See Mayo v. 
Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310, 317 (1940); 
Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F .2d 1172, 1178 (3d 
Cir. 1990). 
 
Thus, the District Court's extension of the Decr ee cannot 
be justified as a proper exercise of the court's modification 
power under the rule set out in Chrysler Corp. v. United 
States, 316 U.S. 556, 562 (1942), and United States v. 
United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 249 (1968), 
because the court did not make a finding of changed 
circumstances that thwarted the basic purpose behind the 
Decree such that the Decree failed to accomplish its 
designed result. Furthermore, the extension of the entire 
Decree cannot be justified as a valid exer cise of the court's 
compliance enforcement power, because the court's very 
limited findings did not show that extending the whole 
Decree was necessary to remedy the violation and thus 
provide the parties with what they originally bargained for. 
 
There may have been various breaches of the Consent 
Decree by NJDOC that would support the extension of 
other sections or even the entire Decree, but we are not in 
a position to discern that from the r ecord before us. The 
District Court is intimately familiar with the cir cumstances 
surrounding the Consent Decree as well as the actions of 
the parties with respect to their compliance with that 
Decree, and it is therefore for that court to make specific 
findings in these areas if it decides to extend the Decree. 
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See EEOC v. Local 580, 925 F.2d 588, 594-95 (2d Cir. 
1991) (upholding district court's orders enfor cing 
compliance with a consent decree because district court 
recounted in detail relevant portions of the history of the 
litigation, thereby establishing a specific factual record of 
the party's non-compliance with the decree). Because the 
District Court failed to make such specific findings, we 
must vacate its order extending the Decr ee and remand the 
case to that court for such further findings of fact. 
 
As we noted earlier, the District Court did make a specific 
finding that NJDOC was in substantial non-compliance 
with P 15 of the Decree. This finding would be sufficient to 
support an extension of that section of the Decr ee, along 
with any other section that is necessary for r emedying this 
non-compliance with P 15, but this extension would have to 
be limited to only those sections. Cf. Halder man v. 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 901 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(affirming district court's extension of certain specific 
provisions of a consent decree beyond the original deadline 
for these provisions contained within the decr ee in order to 
remedy the defendants' non-compliance after district court 
made specific findings that the defendants wer e not in 
substantial compliance with these decree sections); United 
States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers , 55 F.3d 64 (2d 
Cir. 1995) (affirming the district court's extension of a 
specific aspect of a consent decree--the term of an 
administrator appointed under the terms of the decree-- 
because that extension was necessary to ensur e compliance 
by a non-compliant party). Although the District Court's 
"interest in protecting the integrity of such a decree justifies 
any reasonable action taken by the court to secure 
compliance," Local 359, 55 F.3d at 69 (internal quotations 
and citations omitted), the court's extension of the entire 
Decree based on NJDOC's non-compliance with only one 
minor part of it would not be reasonable, especially in light 
of the Supreme Court's admonition that a court's 
compliance enforcement power is "not unlimited." Spallone 
v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276 (1990). 
 
On remand, the District Court should be clear as to 
which inherent power--compliance enfor cement or 
modification--it is using as the basis for extending the 
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Decree. From what we can glean from the District Court's 
incomplete findings, the facts of this case seem to fit more 
closely with an exercise of the court's compliance 
enforcement power, as the extension of the Decree here 
seems most accurately described as an order r emedying a 
party's non-compliance rather than a modification in 
response to changed circumstances. 
 
The plaintiffs counter that NJDOC's non-compliance is a 
"change in circumstances" from those in place when the 
Decree was entered into, and the court's exercise of its 
modification power was justified because this non- 
compliance thwarted the "basic purpose" of the Decree and 
the Decree has thereby "failed to accomplish" its intended 
result. See Chrysler Corp. v. United States , 316 U.S. 556, 
562 (1942); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 
U.S. 244, 249 (1968); see also Akers v. Ohio Dep't of Liquor 
Control, 902 F.2d 477 (6th Cir . 1990) (holding that it was 
an abuse of discretion for the district court to refuse to 
modify a consent decree by extending it when the parties 
originally intended to provide for four years of reports on 
compliance with the decree and the district court's nearly 
four-year stay of the decree's reporting requirement 
thwarted this basic purpose). We think, however, that the 
plaintiffs' approach would in effect lead to the modification 
power swallowing the compliance enforcement power--every 
act of non-compliance would also be a changed 
circumstance, potentially justifying modification. This 
approach was rejected by the Seventh Cir cuit in South v. 
Rowe, 759 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1985), where the court held 
that a party's violation of a consent decree did not 
constitute an extraordinary or unforeseeable changed 
circumstance, so modification of the decr ee was not 
appropriate in response to such non-compliance. See id. at 
614. Because there are distinct bodies of jurisprudence and 
different standards associated with the compliance 
enforcement and modification powers, we believe that a 
district court should relegate these powers to their 
respective spheres. See supra note 13. That is, a district 
court should use its compliance enforcement power when a 
party to a decree violates the decree, and use its 
modification power when circumstances surr ounding the 
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decree (other than the parties' actions) ar e sufficiently 
changed.17 
 
If the District Court decides on remand to use its 
compliance enforcement power to extend the Decr ee, the 
court must make specific findings regar ding the exact 
Decree sections with which NJDOC failed to comply, and 
must determine which sections of the Decr ee must be 
extended to remedy this non-compliance and thus provide 
the parties with the relief that was originally bargained for 
in the Decree. See Halderman, 901 F.2d at 316, 321-25; 
Local 359, 55 F.3d at 69. On the other hand, if the court 
decides to use its modification power to extend the decree, 
it must make specific findings on how changed 
circumstances (which would not include NJDOC's non- 
compliance simpliciter) have stymied the objectives the 
parties intended to achieve with the Decree. See Chrysler, 
316 U.S. at 562; United Shoe, 391 U.S. at 249. Specifically, 
the court should apply the standard for plaintiff-requested 
decree modification that, as we noted earlier , is set forth in 
Chrysler and United Shoe: a court can modify a consent 
decree "in adaption to changed circumstances" if "time and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. There is a Third Circuit case that seems at first glance to have 
implicitly accepted the use of the modification power to remedy a party's 
non-compliance. In Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, 807 F.2d 330 (3d 
Cir. 1986), we affirmed the district court's modification of an injunctive 
decree (which extended the decree for two years) even though the district 
court modified the decree because of defendant's non-compliance. 
However, the issue of whether it was pr oper to modify the decree in 
response to non-compliance was not befor e us in Local Union 542, as we 
expressly noted that the non-compliant party did not challenge the 
district court's power to modify the decree. See id. at 334. 
 
In a sense, our distinguishing of the modification and compliance 
enforcement powers is arguably a mer e exercise in semantics, as a 
court's use of its compliance enforcement power to extend a consent 
decree seems on its face to be a modification of the decree's terms. But 
because of the different standards and bodies of jurisprudence 
associated with these two powers, we think it is important to keep these 
powers distinct. There are situations in which the application of these 
different standards would lead to different outcomes (e.g., a court's 
order 
may meet the standard for a proper exer cise of the court's modification 
power but not meet the standard for the compliance enforcement power), 
so jurisprudential concerns mandate the separation of these powers. 
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experience have demonstrated" that "the decr ee has failed 
to accomplish" its objectives. United Shoe , 391 U.S. at 248- 
49; see also Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, 807 F.2d 330, 
334 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing United Shoe  as the applicable 
standard for district court's modification of consent decree 
when the plaintiff seeks to have decree modified because 
the decree has not achieved the intended r esult). 
 
Furthermore, if the District Court uses its modification 
power to extend the Decree, then the court should tailor the 
modification to account for the changed cir cumstances and 
to achieve the original Decree objectives. See United Shoe, 
391 U.S. at 252 ("[T]he District Court should modify the 
decree so as to achieve the requir ed result . . . ."); United 
States v. Local 560, 974 F.2d 315, 333 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(holding that district court should modify decr ee to the 
extent that such a modification "is necessary to accomplish 
the remedy sought by the original equitable decree"); see 
also Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail , 502 U.S. 367, 
391 (1992) (holding that, if a decree modification is found 
to be warranted, the district court should then make sure 
that the modification is "tailored to r esolve the problems 
created by the change in circumstances"). 
 
In sum, the District Court must make specificfindings to 
support its extension of the Consent Decree, and it must 
tailor this extension to fit with these findings. Given the 
record before us, we believe that an extension in this case 
would likely involve an exercise of the District Court's 
compliance enforcement power, but of course the court 
must itself decide which of the two powers is implicated by 
the specific findings it will make.18  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. The plaintiffs' cross-appeal can be dealt with summarily. First, class 
counsel argues that the District Court's denial of the plaintiffs' motion 
to 
hold NJDOC in contempt was based on an error of law and unsupported 
factual assumptions. "Our review of the denial of a contempt motion is 
for abuse of discretion by the district court. Reversal is appropriate 
only 
where the denial is based on an error of law or a finding of fact that is 
clearly erroneous." Roe v. Operation Rescue, 54 F.3d 133, 137 (3d Cir. 
1995) (internal quotations omitted). Class counsel's argument here is 
based on an offhand comment that the District Court made in an oral 
argument hearing on a contempt motion that is not the one at issue in 
this appeal; we find this argument to be completely without merit. 
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Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's May 10, 
2000 Order extending the entire Consent Decree will be 
vacated, and the District Court's July 25, 2000 Or der 
denying the plaintiffs' motion for re-ar gument on their 
motion for contempt and denying the plaintif f 's motion to 
extend the Decree for two years will be affir med. The case 
will be remanded to the District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Parties to bear 
their own costs. 
 
The mandate shall issue forthwith. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
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The plaintiffs' second argument on cr oss-appeal is that the District 
Court erred when it only extended the Consent Decree for ten months, 
rather than for the two years that the plaintif fs asked for. We review a 
district court's decision to modify or to refuse to modify a consent 
decree 
for abuse of discretion. See Delawar e Valley Citizens' Council for Clean 
Air v. Pennsylvania, 674 F.2d 976, 978 (3d Cir. 1982). The plaintiffs 
contend that NJDOC's "pervasive pattern of delayed compliance and 
downright non-compliance with the Decree" called for a two year 
extension of the Decree, so that the court's ten month extension was an 
abuse of discretion. This claim fails because we concluded above that the 
District Court did not make sufficient factualfindings of NJDOC's non- 
compliance to extend any part of the Decree besides P 15. Because the 
District Court's factual findings did not support the extension of the 
entire Decree for ten months, the court could not have abused its 
discretion by failing to extend the Decr ee for an even longer period of 
time. 
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